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TESTING THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: THE BLOCKING OF
SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP
MATTHEW R. DARDENNE*
It was late Saturday, June 13, 2009 when the rumbling of a stolen
election began moving through the Twittersphere. 1 On June 12th,
many thought the Iranian presidential election between Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi would be close. 2 To the
contrary, Ahmadinejad won a sweeping victory that defied the polls and
was quickly dismissed as a fraud. 3 In reaction, the Iranian people took
to the streets and riots lasted long into the next week. 4
Despite the outrage, few traditional media outlets reported the
story of Iran's growing Green Revolution.5 Instead, the protests were
mostly reported by text, tweets, and through other social media.6
Tehran's authoritarian regime responded by taking down the telephone
* Shareholder, Dardenne and Boyd, Inc. Adjunct Professor, San Joaquin College of
Law, Clovis California. Grateful former student of Ved P. Nanda.
1. Steven Hodson, Twitter, Social Media and the Revolution in Iran, THE INQUISITR,
June 16 2009, available at http://www.inquisitr.com/26311/twitter-social-media-and-the-
revolution-in-iran/.
2. Lee Baker, The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Export Restrictions on Software
and Online Services for American Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 23 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 537, 537-38 (2010) (citing Colin Freeman, Iran Election: 'Unprecedented' Turnout
Boosts Challenge to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 12, 2009, available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran//55 15813/Iran-electionun
precedented-turnout-boosts-challenge-to-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad.html; Peter Goodspeed,
Election Leaves Iran Polarized, NAT'L PosT, June 13, 2009, availble at http://www.nat
ionalpost.com/m/story.html?id=1693833).
3. Id. (citing Glenn Kessler & Jon Cohen, Signs of Fraud Abound, but Not Hard
Evidence, WASH. POST, June 16, 2009, Al, availble at http:// www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/15/AR200906 1 503235.html; Maziar Bahari, 'It's
a Coup d'Etat', NEWSWEEK, June 13, 2009, available at http://www.news
week.com/id/201956; Colin Freeman, Iran Elections: Revolt as Crowds Protest at
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 'Rigged' Victory, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 13, 2009, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/552672 1/Iran-elections-rev
olt-as-crowds-protest-at-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejads-rigged-victory.html).
4. The Washington Times, Editorial, Iran's Twitter Revolution: Witnessing a New
Chapter in the Quest for Freedom, THE WASH. TIMES, June 16, 2009, A20, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution.
5. Hodson, supra note 1.
6. Iran's Twitter Revolution, supra note 4.
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system supporting SMS text messaging and blocking other cellular
networks. Iran's highly computer-literate society, including bloggers
and hackers, fought back, kept channels open and spread the word
about functioning proxy portals.7
The immediacy of the reports was stunning and gripping. Twitter
lists constantly gave updates and provided links to photos and videos,
which acutely demonstrated the developing turmoil.8 Photos and videos
were posted on Twitter and Youtube. The video footage that emerged
was "raw, unedited and dramatic";9 it captured images of "young people
throwing rocks, scenes of burning tires and vehicles, and riot police
delivering savage beatings."'0 Others showed protestors peacefully
shouting "Marg bar dictator!" (Death to the dictator!)11
Ultimately, the scene turned violent as paramilitary Basij and
police rooftop snipers opened fire. Reports of deaths tweeted out, and
within minutes, a gruesome picture circulated of a man lying face-up in
the street, blood covering his face and pooled around his head. Other
photos followed of other people bloodied or dead. Soon there were
reports of nonstop shooting and opposition leaders arrested. A
crackdown was under way.12
While Tehran was not able to completely choke off access to text
and Twitter, its abuse of its citizens coupled with the crackdown on
avenues of organization through social media and telecommunications
brought the short lived Green Revolution to an end. The first digital
revolution was over before it began.
A year before Iran was cracking down on access to Twitter and text
messaging, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, Robert F. Godec, was
providing embarrassing details of the opulent life styles of Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali, the President of Tunisia, and his family to his
superiors in the United States.13 In one of the cables, Ambassador
Godec referred to the Tunisian president and his siblings as "The
Family" and likened them to the mafia who ran Tunisia's economy.14
These cables were part of the tens of thousands of pages leaked to
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See also YouTube videos of Iranian Revolution, IRAN'S GREEN REVOLUTION -
MOVEMENT TOWARDS FREEDOM 2011 IRAN, http://iranianrevolution.wordpress.com (last
visited Jan. 28, 2012).
10. Iran's Twitter Revolution, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Judy Bachrach, WikiHistory: Did the Leaks Inspire the Arab Spring?, WORLD
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2011, available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/wiki
history-did-leaks-inspire-arab-spring.
14. Dubai, Wikileaks Might Have Triggered Tunis' Revolution, AL ARABIYA NEWS,
Jan. 15, 2011, available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/15/133592.html.
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Wikileaks that were then disclosed in November 2010 online and to
various media outlets. Ultimately, the cable was read and shared via
Facebook and Twitter 5 throughout Tunisia's significant online
population. 16
Like the stolen election in Iran, these cables acted as digital tinder
ready to be ignited by the rage of an oppressed people. A few weeks
later, the spark was literally lit, igniting a revolution across the Arab
world. Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor, was harassed by a
policewoman for failing to have a license to sell vegetables from his
street cart.17 When local government authorities failed to intervene, he
set himself ablaze outside the governmental compound in a desperate
act of self-immolation.18 His act was caught on film, streamed across
the web, and shared on Facebook and Twitter. Bouazizi's single act of
protest, combined with the leaked documents, fueled an entire
movement across the Arab world. 19
As the revolt blazed across Tunisia, both Egypt and Libya moved
quickly to block access to the internet, social media, and telephone
service. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi's government blocked access to
several internet websites. Access to Facebook was cut as protests
developed in the Libyan capital.20 Libya also cut access to Al Jazeera for
its reporting on the unrest.21
"On January 28, 2011, Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, took the
drastic and unprecedented step of shutting off the Internet for five days
across [Egypt]."22 Mubarak took these steps to stop the coordination of
protestors on Facebook and Twitter. 23  Representatives from both
Facebook and Twitter later confirmed access to their sites was being
15. Bachrach, supra note 13.
16. Id. (statement of Radwan Masmoudi, president for the Center for the Study of
Islam and Democracy) ("Something like two million among ten million people have their
own Facebook account.").
17. Yasmine Ryan, The Tragic Life of a Street Vendor, ALJAZEERA, Jan. 20, 2011,
available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.
html.
18. Id.
19. Bachrach, supra note 13. See also John Thorne, Bouazizi has become a Tunisian
Protest 'Symbol,' THE NATIONAL, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.thenational.ae/
news/worldwidelbouazizi-has-become-a-tunisian-protest-symbol.
20. Emil Protalinski, Libya Blocks Access to Facebook, Al Jazeera, Others, ZDNET
(Feb. 18, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/libya-blocks-access-to-
facebook-al-jazeera-others/302.
21. Id.
22. Amir Hatem Ali, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New Tools for
Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 185 (2011).
23. Id.
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blocked.24 Like Iran, Egypt also disrupted text messaging and
Blackberry services. 25
As the Arab Revolution spread, several more countries blocked
access to social media sites, internet search engines, and news sites.
Since the Arab Spring, Facebook has been either totally or partially
blocked in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Pakistan. 26 Twitter was partially blocked in Algeria, Egypt, Iran and
Pakistan. YouTube remains completely blocked in Turkey and is
partially blocked in Iran and Pakistan. 2 7 Arab states are not alone;
many other nations block social media including, most notably, China,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Cameroon, and even, to
some extent, Mexico. 2 8
The power of social media during the Arab Revolution should not be
overblown; "digital media didn't oust Hosni Mubarak." 29
"[O]veremphasizing the role of information technology diminishes the
personal risks that individual protesters took in heading out onto the
streets to face tear gas and bullets." 30 At the same time, the role of
social media and the internet at large during the Arab Spring cannot be
denied. Newsweek called the protest in Egypt a "Facebook Revolt." 31
The images of the self-immolation of Bouazizi circulated in "cyberspace
before being broadcast by Middle East media corporation al-Jazeera." 32
24. Elinor Mills, Internet Disruptions Hit Egypt, CNET NEWS (Jan 27, 2011, 5:06
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20029857-245.html.
25. Id.; Hamza Hendawi & Sarah El Deeb, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Egypt Disrupts
Internet Service in Crackdown, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 2, 2011, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-01-28/news/27054360_1_crackdown-cell-phone-service-
muslim-brotherhood.
26. Id. See Social Media Filtering Map, OPENNET INITIATIVE, available at
http://opennet.net/research/map/socialmedia (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). (The OpenNet
Initiative (ONI) is a collaborative partnership of three institutions: the Citizen Lab at the
Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group. Drawing on testing conducted in
2008-2009 as well as media reports collected since 2004, ONI has compiled data from on
the most frequently blocked social media sites around the world. ONI maintains an
interactive map that demonstrates social media sites that have been censored at any
point since their creation. ONI reports the states listed above as blocking social media
sitesDocument2).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Philip N. Howard, The Arab Spring's Cascading Effects, MILLER-MCCUNE, Feb.
23, 2011, available at http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-
arab-spring-28575/#.
30. Id.
31. Mike Giglio, NEWSWEEK, Inside Egypt's Facebook Revolt, THE DAILY BEAST, Jan.
27, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/01/27/inside-egypt-s-
facebook- revolt. html.
32. Erika R. George, Tweeting to Topple Tyranny, Social Media and Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Reply to Anupam Chander, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 23, 24 (2011) (citing
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U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, captured the
potential of social media when she commented "the power of social
networking to channel and champion public sentiment, has been more
evident in the past few weeks than ever before." 33
The effects of blocking social media and other websites raise serious
questions related to the "congenital tension" ever present between the
recognition and enforcement of state sovereignty and the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 34 On the one hand, states
have a sovereign prerogative to protect their territorial integrity and
independence from destabilizing forces like armed intervention,
whether of an external or internal nature, and mass protests that
threaten the life of the nation.35 On the other hand, states also have an
obligation to protect human rights such as the right to hold opinions,
the freedom of expression and speech, the right to receive and transmit
information, the right to hold and transmit ideas of all kinds in writing
and print through any media of a person's choice, and the right to
peaceful assembly.36
Today, this tension is made increasingly more complex by a web of
overlapping international obligations stemming, not only from human
rights law, but also from modern trade and investment regimes: many
developing states blocking access to social media and the internet at
large are members of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and are
often parties to treaties protecting investment as a means to improve
economic conditions and to gain access to the ever expanding global
Tunisia's Revolution: Watching and Waiting, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2011,
11:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/tunisiasrevolution).
33. Howard, supra note 29.
34. FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 3 (3d ed. 2005). See also Muna Ndulo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
and Security and Reconstruction, 44 AKRON L. REV. 769, 773 (recognizing the tension in
the U.N. Charter "between the doctrines of national sovereignty and the protection and
promotion of individual rights and the promotion of peace and security generally in the
context of a civil war").
35. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly
Relations Declaration]; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res.
2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131(XX) (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter Inadmissibility of
Intervention Declaration] (While the Friendly Relations Declaration, and the
Inadmissibility of Intervention Declaration outlawing aggression apply primarily in the
context of international relations between states, and not intrastate issues, these legal
principles firmly support a state's right to territorial integrity and political independence).
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 1,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR] (providing that a state may suspend rights protected under the ICCPR during
times of declared, publicly declared national emergency threatening life to the nation).
36. ICCPR, arts. 19, 21.
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market place. As a result, when states move to block and censure
material on the internet as an exercise of their sovereign rights, they
not only trample their human rights obligations, but they may also be
in violation of other international obligations created by the
international trade and investment regimes.
As goods, services, telecommunications, and other unrealized
future business ventures move to and develop because of the internet,
and as the internet becomes subject to increasing regulation and
censorship, 37 sophisticated e-commerce business interests will no doubt
turn to the protections afforded by international law to protect their
interests. 38 When business interests, such as social media, overlap with
and touch upon individuals' human rights, trade and investment
protections may actually serve as a collateral method to enforce human
rights obligations. Trends in international e-commerce are already
pointing to this result.
For instance, in 2010 Google shocked the world when, in the face of
China's increased censorship, it ended its nascent presence in China
and began routing Chinese users to its uncensored search engine in
Hong Kong. 39 Essentially the dispute between China and Google arose
when Google discovered a highly sophisticated cyber attack originating
from China on the Gmail email accounts of Chinese human rights
activists.40 In response, Google decided it would no longer censor
Chinese internet searches as required by Chinese law. When
negotiations broke down between China and Google over the dispute,
37. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 26 (compiled list of various countries'
internet regulation and censorship activities by month in 2010).
38. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment
Arbitration: the Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 357, 359-60 (2010)
(noting it is likely that an international investment arbitration involving intellectual
property rights in e-commerce is likely "given the trajectory of the modern economy, in
which foreign investments reflect an increasing concentration of intellectual capital
invested in knowledge goods protected by [intellectual property rights]").
39. Cynthia Liu, Internet Censorship as a Trade Barrier: A Look at the WTO
Consistency of the Great Firewall in the Wake of the China-Google Dispute, 42 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 1199, 1200-01 (2011).
40. Id. (citing Google May Quit China over Cyber-Attacks, MSNBC (Jan. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34831106/. A report issued by iDefense, a
computer security company owned by Verisign, states that thirty-three other companies
were targeted in the attack spanning the Internet, media, finance, technology, and
chemical sectors. Thomas Claburn, Chinese Spy Agency Behind Google Cyber Attack,
Report Claims, INFO. WK. (Jan. 14, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.
com/news/security/attacks/222300848 (claiming Adobe, Internet Web hosting company
Rackspace, Dow Chemical, and Northrop Grumman are some of the companies that were
targeted in these series of coordinated cyber-attacks)).
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Google stunningly announced it would leave China and reroute Chinese
searches through Hong Kong.41
Similarly, "Go Daddy.com, the world's largest domain name
registration company, announced on March 24, 2010 that it would no
longer sell .cn domain names, citing similar fears of hacking and an
unwillingness to continue to comply with stringent government
requirements."4 2 In its announcement, "Go Daddy.com specifically
referenced the heightened requirements for documenting and verifying
the identity of domain name registrants and what it perceived to be
increased threats against individual security as reasons for
discontinuing the offering of new .cn domain names."4 3
Cynthia Liu makes a compelling argument that a case could be
brought through the auspices of the World Trade Organization's
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") to protect against such censorship. 44 Indeed, the
United States announced in October, 2011, that it would seek detailed
information on the trade impact of Chinese policies that may block U.S.
companies' websites in China under Article III of GATS which allows
member states to request information from another member state on its
measures that affect the operation of GATS.4 5 The European
Parliament has also passed a resolution calling on the European Union
to treat Internet censorship as a trade barrier. 46
While the DSB may provide one form of relief for such conduct, it
does not provide a direct means of enforcement.47 Generally, private
41. Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute over
Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/
technology/23google.html.
42. Liu, supra note 39, at 1201 (citing Alexei Alexis & Kathleen E. McLaughlin,
Muted Reaction in China Greets Go Daddy's Departure Announcement, 27 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 503 (Apr. 8, 2010)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1211-33.
45. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, United States Seeks Detailed Information on China's Internet Restrictions
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/
october/united-states-seeks-detailed-information-china% E2 % 80% 99s-i.
46. Brian R. Israel, "Make Money Without Doing Evil?" Caught between Authoritarian
Regulations in Emerging Markets and a Global Law of Human Rights, U.S. ICTS Face a
Twofold Quandary, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 652, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ[LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:184E:0016:0022:EN:PDF
(referring to The EU's Strategy to Deliver Market Access to European Countries 2009 O.J.
(C 184).
47. See Alberto Alemanno, Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System,
Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers, 2 nn.5 & 6
(2004) available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&
context=1ps-clacp.
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entities can petition their governments to bring a case through the DSB
on an affected industry or corporation's behalf as a matter of diplomatic
protection,48 but as a matter of right, the entity has no ability to bring
the case directly. Also, governments have no obligation to bring the
case on the affected party's behalf. 49
Meanwhile, the protections found in international investment law
always provide for private dispute resolution, and may provide a
powerful method to respond to internet censorship. Notably, the United
States and China are not currently parties to an international
investment arbitration agreement ("IA"), although one is currently
being negotiated.50 However, turning back to the censorship of the
internet during the Arab Revolution, many Arab nations affected by the
Arab Spring, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, and Bahrain,
have entered into HAs with the United States such that organizations
like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Google could take action directly
for the blocking of their digital platforms. The provisions of other IIAs
with non-Arab countries blocking social media, such as Vietnam, could
also be invoked. 51
While there are many facets of international investment
arbitration, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate how
jurisdiction could be established against sovereign states for the
suppression of social media and censorship of the internet and to
provide a brief, but not exhaustive, analysis of the claims that could be
brought therefore. Part I of this article introduces the concept of social
media and evaluates the property interests inherent in social media.
Part II then turns to a brief introduction of HAs. Much has been
written concerning investment law over the last decade such that it is
unnecessary to thoroughly reexamine what has already been done. The
bulk of this article is devoted to Part III, which discuses whether social
media, especially those services that originate in the capital exporting
state, meet the definition of an investment under particular investment
treaties. While the definition of an investment under IIAs is generally
broad, modern investment arbitration tribunals have restricted its
applicability. Therefore, from a jurisdictional standpoint, it is essential
that social media and particular internet sites be considered as an
investment; otherwise an arbitration tribunal would lack jurisdiction
rationae materiae to hear the dispute. Part IV briefly illuminates the
claims social media could bring for internet censorship. Ultimately,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Sarah Anderson, U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations-Fact Sheet,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/reports/us-china-bilateral investment-treaty-negotiations.
51. See Bilateral Trade Agreement, U.S.-Viet., July 13, 2000, Statement by the
President: Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, 2001 WL 634226.
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more research is needed in this area to fully explore how such claims
are likely to be evaluated. Finally, Part V concludes that social media
and internet based platforms may bring claims that will withstand the
jurisdictional hurdles of international investment law.
Before turning to the dynamics of international investment
arbitration in the context of social media, it should be noted that it has
been more than fifty years since the first modern bilateral investment
agreement entered into force between Germany and Pakistan.52 For the
first forty years of that history, instances of disputes were relatively
rare. But, over the last ten-plus years, as the number of IIAs
proliferated, great growth in the number of the reported cases
occurred.53 The overwhelming majority of reported cases have been
brought by investors of developed nations against developing states for
treatment related to investments in infrastructure and natural
resources. 54 The size and scope of the awards have resulted in many
calling into question the legitimacy of international investment
arbitration55 under the perception that IIAs threaten state sovereignty
and sustainable economic development.56
While there are legitimate concerns about the impact international
investment arbitration has on these issues, the future of international
investment arbitration over the next forty years could be far nobler if
corporations like Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other forms
of new media embrace ideas of corporate social responsibility by using
tools at their disposal to prevent abuses of human rights.5 7 Certainly
there are limits to speech on the internet; most countries use
cybersieves to filter undesirable content.58 Whether it is copyrighted
songs in the United States5 9 or political dissent in the Middle East, the
goal is the same: "Countries differ not in their intent to limit access to
52. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fed. Republic Ger.-Pak.,
Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575.
53. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 435 (2009).
54. Id. at 446.
55. Franck, supra note 53, at 436-37.
56. Jose E. Alvarez, Book Review, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 382 (2011) (reviewing
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(2009)).
57. George, supra note 32, at 35; see also Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2011).
58. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L. J. 377, 379 (2009).
59. Id. See also Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (SOPA allows the
Attorney General to seek injunctions that would compel U.S. search engines and other
sites to block domain names or search results against foreign websites that steal and sell
American innovations, intellectual property, and products. The bill increases criminal
penalties for individuals who traffic in counterfeit medicine and military goods, which put
innocent civilians and American soldiers at risk. And it improves coordination between IP
enforcement agencies in the U.S.).
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material online, but in the content they ban, the precision of their
blocking, and the voice they offer citizens in decision making."60 At
some point though, the threshold is breached; a state's censorship and
blocking of social media and the internet at large infringes on
fundamental freedoms. At that point, international investment
arbitration can be used as a powerful weapon not only to protect the
value of the investment, but also the rights of those whose use of the
medium gave value to the investment in the first place.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL MEDIA
Like other forms of property, economic interests in social media and
other internet platforms stem from a range of rights that likely fall
within the substantive and procedural protections provided by HAs.
These rights range from the value of shares in the entities that own
social media, the myriad property rights now associated with domain
names, the proprietary technological and intellectual property rights
owned by social media, and possibly, although controversially, rights to
the ultimate content of and access to users of social media.
The term "social media" refers to internet-based applications that
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 that
enable people to communicate and share resources and information. 61
In essence, social media are forms of electronic communications used for
networking and microblogging, through which users create online
communities and content to share information, ideas, personal
messages, and other material.62
Examples of social media include a wide array of blogs, discussion
forums, chat rooms, and wikis. 63 Prominent social media sites include
Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, and Twitter. 64 Social media can be
accessed by computer, smart and cellular phones, and mobile phone text
messaging (SMS). To some degree, the entire web is one gigantic social
media platform.
60. Bambauer, supra note 58, at 379.
61. Bruce R. Lindsay, Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options, and
Policy Considerations, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE R41987, 1 (Sep. 6, 2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homeseclR41987.pdf; Andreas Kaplan & Michael
Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media,
BUSINESS HORIZONs 53, 59 (2009).
62. John M. Miller, Is MySpace really My Space? Examining the Discoverability of the
Contents of Social Media Accounts, 30 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 28, 28 (2011) (citing
Merriam Webster Dictionary available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
social%20media).
63. Lindsay, supra note 61, at 1.
64. Id.
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The use of social media is an evolving phenomenon. 65 During the
past decade, rapid changes in communication technologies have enabled
people to interact and share information in ways that were non-existent
or commercially unavailable as recently as fifteen years ago. 6 6
The property rights inherent in social media are also evolving. It is
an extreme understatement to say that the shares in the corporations
that developed successful social media platforms are valuable. Forbes
lists Mark Zuckerberg's wealth at $17.5 billion;67 Sergey Brin and Larry
Page, the Google Guys, are worth $12 billion each.68 The lawsuits
underscoring the movie The Social Network, and the interests involved
therein are immense. 69 Because shares in corporations are generally
protected under modern HAs, such economic interests in social media
will generally be protected thereunder.
The intellectual property rights in both domain names of social
media and the proprietary coding that make them function are also
valuable property rights. "A domain name consists of two parts: a top
level domain and a secondary level domain."70 The top level domain is
the domain name's suffix like .com or .org. The secondary level domain
is the remainder of the address, and today often includes the names of
valuable trademarks identifying a corporation's goods or services.
Together, the complete domain name allows a user to link to a specific
computer's IP address by routing the user to the provider of the
content. 71
Domain names are generally considered a valuable intangible
property right 72 or, in rare cases, a tangible property right, 73 both of
65. See Id.
66. Id.
67. Forbes 400 Richest Americans, Mark Zuckerberg, FORBES, http://www.forbes.
com/profile/mark-zuckerberg (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
68. Forbes 400 Richest Americans, Sergey Brin, FORBES, http://www.forbes.
com/lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-people Sergey-BrinD664.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2012); Forbes 400 Richest Americans, Larry Page, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com
1lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-peopleLarry-PageXFXI.html (last visited Jan.
24, 2012).
69. Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU, Inc., No. C 07-01389, 2008 WL
4793665 (N.D.Cal. 2008) affirmed by Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc.,
640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
70. FAQ: Domain Name, available at http://domainwhiz.net/faq-domainname.html.
71. See Jennifer Gong, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property in International
Treaties, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101, 109 (2011).
72. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that domain
names are intangible property); see also OBG Ltd v. Allan (2007) UKHL 21, 1 A.C. 1, 32
(separate opinion of Lord Hoffman stating "have no difficulty with the proposition that a
domain name may be intangible property, like a copyright or trade mark"); see also 15
U.S.C. §1125(d) (2006) (treating domain names as property subject to in rem proceedings
in the ACPA); Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 260 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("Congress may treat a domain name registration as property subject to in rem
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which are generally protectable under HAs. In other instances, domain
names have been considered contractual rights, 74 but this seems to be
the minority view.75 Rather, domain names are generally considered
intangible property because registrants of domain names have the right
to:
a) possess the domain name to the exclusion of others; b) use
the domain name as its 'locator' on the Internet; c) manage the
domain name by designating the registrar; d) enjoy the income
from the domain name; e) dispose of the domain name by sale or
transfer; and f) exclude others from using its domain name.76
Regardless of how they are characterized, domain names have
tremendous value. Corporations have paid millions to acquire domain
names77 and engaged in expensive lawsuits to prevent cybersquatting
and unlawful trading upon their protected marks included within
domain names. Likewise, governments have responded to these actions
jurisdiction if it chooses, without violating the Constitution."); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-
Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Congress clearly intended to treat domain
names as property for purposes of the ACPA's in rem provisions.").
73. Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Technologies, LLC, 620 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1285 (D. Utah
2009) (finding that a website is tangible property).
74. Wornow v. Register.Com, Inc., 778 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (App. Div. 2004) (N.Y. statute
making self-renewing contracts unenforceable do not apply to domain name registrations
because a domain name that is "not trademarked or patented is not personal property,
but rather a contract right that cannot exist separate and apart from the services
performed by a register such as defendant."); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc.,
529 S.E.2d 80, 86-87 (2000).
75. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
Right, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 42-43 (2004); Jeffery A. Maine, Tax Considerations: Domain
Name Acquisitions and Web Site Development, SK102 ALI-ABA 205, 213 (2005) ("Domain
names should not be treated for tax purposes as government licenses or contracts for
services, but instead should be treated as valuable intangible property"); Xuan-Thao N.
Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain Name
Classification, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 203 (2001) ("decisions in Umbro and Dorer fail
to correctly classify domain names"); see also eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058
(N.D.Ca. 2000); Register.com v. Verio Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that websites should be treated as chattel and thus as property). See Kremen 337
F.3d at 1029 (stating that Network Solutions all but conceded that registrants have
property rights in their domain names); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 858, 860 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating that Network Solution admits that domain
names are intangible personal property).
76. Beverly A. Berneman, Navigating the Bankruptcy Waters in a Domain Name
Rowboat, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 61, 66 (2003).
77. In 1998, Compaq Computer Corp. paid $3.35 million to AltaVista Technology for
the right to use the "altavista.com." Compaq and Alta Vista Settle Internet Address
Dispute, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1998, at B12; Julia Angwin, San Jose Man Hits Gold-3.3
million web name Compaq pays big for internet address, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July
28, 1998, at Al.
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to ensure consumers have access to their trademarks. '1 Consequently,
domain names will likely be treated as a valuable property right
protected under most HAs.
In addition to the intangible property rights in domain names,
domain names also contain valuable trademark rights, which are
protected under HAs. It is well established that certain domain names
may be registered as trademarks. 79 Like other trademarks, under the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office guidelines for the registration of
domain names as trademarks, "domain names are entitled to the
protection afforded to trademarks if they are arbitrary, fanciful,
suggestive, or descriptive, with acquired secondary meaning."80
Trademarks are now almost universally protected by HAs. As a result,
trademarks included in domain names will likely be protected under
HAs as well.
Finally, social media sites routinely require terms of use contracts
that possibly give them an ownership interest in user generated content
("USG"). For instance, while Facebook's terms of use ("TOU") assert
that the user owns any content he or she creates and uploads to the
site, its TOU also states in part, "'[fjor content that is covered by
intellectual property rights, like photos and videos ('IP content'),' the
user grants Facebook a 'nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable,
royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content' that the user posts
'on or in connection with Facebook."' 81  Similarly, the TOU for
Linkedln, a social media platform for business professionals, mandates
users grant "'a nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual,
unlimited, assignable, sub-licensable, fully paid up and royalty free
right to [LinkedIn] to copy, prepare derivative works of, improve,
distribute, publish, remove, retain, add, process, analyze, use and
commercialize, in any way now known or in the future discovered, any
information [the user] provide[s]."'82 These unrestricted licenses grant
social media a protected right in UGC. Under international investment
law that protected right is also protected and may, even if
78. 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (2006).
79. Image Online Design, Inc. v. Core Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(stating PTO governs trademark registrations for domain names); US Dep't of Commerce,
Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guide No. 2-99: Marks Composed, in Whole
or in Part, of Domain Names [hereinafter PTO Examination Guide No. 2-99] (explaining
PTO policy of registering domain names as trademarks); see also Vincent-Joel Proulx,
Borrowing from our Common Law Cousins: American and Britsh Influences on the Merger
of Canadian Trademark and Internet Domain Name Laws, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
505, 505-06 (2005).
80. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 75, at 48.
81. G. Ross Allen & Francine D. Ward, Things Aren't Always as they Appear: Who
Really Owns Your User-Generated Content, 3 No. 2 LANDSLIDE 49, 50 (2010) (citing
Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.facebook.com /terms.php).
82. Id. at 51.
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controversially, extend to an interest in access to current and potential
users of social media themselves.
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
Much has been written concerning the history, development, and
theory of international investment arbitration such that much of it need
not be repeated here.83
The purpose of HAs is simple; HAs safeguard investments made by
qualifying investors in another state from government conduct which
may impinge or otherwise mistreat the value of the investment. 84
While many of the treaties differ in language, they are relatively
uniform: most grant the qualifying investment reciprocal rights, both
procedural and substantive, which may be enforced if the host
government mistreats the investment in a manner prescribed by the
relevant agreement. These agreements generally grant foreign
investors substantive rights, including national and most-favored-
nation ("MFN") treatment, fair and equitable treatment ("FET"), and
protection against expropriation without compensation.85
There are many different forms of HAs. Today there are reportedly
2,700 to 3,000 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), a small number of
regional free trade agreements such as NAFTA86 or ASEAN, 8 7 and
treaties with limited subject matter jurisdiction such as the Energy
Charter Treaty" that allow private dispute resolution.89
Procedurally, an IIA permits private party investors whose
investment has been mistreated to seek direct redress against the host
state through the treaty's dispute resolution mechanism, usually
through the an ad hoc tribunal organized under the auspices of the
World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"), the ICSID Additional Facility rules, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
83. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 211-90 (2008); CAMPBELL McLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE &
MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES (2007); see Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 779-81 (2011).
84. Franck, supra note 83, at 779.
85. Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy:
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J.
INT'L L. 57, 62 (Fall 2011).
86. North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
87. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Aug. 8, 1967.
88. Energy Charter Treaty (Dec. 1994), text available at http://www.encharter.org/.
89. UNCTAD Investment Instruments Online, available at http://www.unctadxi.org/
templates/docsearch_779.aspx.
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Arbitration Rules, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce ("SCC"), or
some other standing arbitration body.
Ordinarily, the individual agreement will provide a specific set of
definitions to determine whether a particular activity or interest will
qualify for the protections of the IIA. If these jurisdictional
prerequisites can be met, and the government conduct falls within the
substantive protections of the IIA, the state will be held internationally
responsible for its wrongful conduct to the qualifying investor.
In the context of the Arab Spring and the blocking of social media,
the United States has entered into IIAs with Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia,
Turkey, and Morocco. 90  Because most social media and internet
locations blocked during the Arab Spring were owned and operated by
U.S. corporations, those corporations would be able to take advantage of
the protections afforded under the IIAs between the United States and
those governments. For the purposes of this article, the jurisdictional
prerequisites and substantive claims related to the blocking and
censuring of internet access shall be predominantly analyzed under the
U.S.-Egypt BIT91 since Egypt was at the center of the Arab Spring and
undisputedly shut down internet access during the heart of the
protests.
Social Media Meets the Jurisdictional Requirements to Bring an
International Investment Claim
In international investment arbitration, three main jurisdictional
prerequisites must be satisfied in no particular order: the tribunal must
have jurisdiction over 1) the parties (ratione personae); 2) the timing of
the dispute (ratione temporis); and 3) the subject matter of the dispute
(ratione materiae).92  These issues are complicated further by
jurisdictional limitations of the dispute settlement apparatus under
which the dispute is brought. For instance, Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention provides:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
90. See id.
91. Treaty between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt
concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Egypt
June 27, 1992 [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt BIT].
92. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Jurisdiction) ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/3, 1 26-31 (Apr. 22, 2005). But see McLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 10 1 1.23
(noting that the "treaty provisions on nationality may be said to deal with arbitral
jurisdiction over persons (ratione personae); the treaty provisions on investment
prescribe the extent of arbitral jurisdiction over subject-matter (ratione materiae). But,
the treaties themselves proceed simply on the basis of nationality and investment, and
the dividing line between persons and things is not exact.").
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State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally. 9
Consequently, Article 25 provides an additional layer of
jurisdictional hurdles that must be overcome.
In bringing claims against states blocking social media and
internet access, the first two jurisdictional prerequisites are easily met.
First, similar to the law of diplomatic protection, to establish
nationality under the relevant IIA, a U.S. corporation need only
establish it is a corporation under the laws of the state under which it is
incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. 94 While
there exist many methods to challenge nationality, in the case of social
media and internet platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, or
YouTube, U.S. nationality would easily be established because all of
these enterprises held continuous U.S. nationality prior to the Arab
Spring. 95
Likewise, such entities could also establish jurisdiction over the
timing of the dispute. In considering the timing of a dispute and
whether a particular IIA applies, reference must always be had to the
particular IIA96 and whether the IIA was in force or can apply
retroactively to the conduct complained. Generally speaking, if a
relevant IIA is in force at the time the violating conduct took place, the
arbitration panel will have jurisdiction over the timing of the dispute.
The relevant U.S. IIAs involved during the Arab Spring, including the
US-Egypt BIT, were all in force long before the events that occurred
during the Arab Spring came to pass. Consequently, social media and
93. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, art. 25, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
94. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 T 70
(Judgment of Feb. 5) (Second Phase) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction]; see also Tokios
Tokeles v. Ukraine (Jurisdiction) 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 205, 220, 38-40 (ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/18 Apr. 29, 2004); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 286 (2001) (stating: "Definitions of corporate nationality in national
legislation or in treaties providing for ICSID's jurisdiction will be controlling for the
determination of whether the nationality requirements of Article 25(2)(b) have been
met.") [hereinafter SCHREUER I].; MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 146, 5.54; Azurix Corp
v. Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (2004) 43 I.L.M. 262, 72 (ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12 Dec. 8, 2003).
95. According to the California Secretary of State website, Facebook Inc., Google,
YouTube and Twitter are all Delaware corporations headquarter and registered to do
business in California. See Business Search, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, available
at http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/cbs.aspx.
96. McLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 174, T 6.38.
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internet platforms would easily be able to establish jurisdiction over the
timing of the dispute.
Establishing the final jurisdictional requirement, jurisdiction
ratione materiae, however, is much more problematic and will be
complicated by the choices of the parties to any potential arbitration.
Is the Economic Interest in Social Media an Investment?
In international investment arbitration, the only true jurisdictional
limitation, ratione materiae, is whether the economic activity or
business interest amounts to an "investment" as that term is
understood in international investment law. Thus, to prevail in any
arbitration challenging the blocking of social media during the Arab
Spring, social media and internet platforms must prove that their
economic interest in those platforms amounts to an "investment."
There are many considerations that impact whether an
"investment" has been made including the language of the applicable
IIA, the scope of economic interests the term covers, limitations possibly
imposed by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 97 and territorial
limitations of where the investment can be made. If the economic
interest, here the interest in social media, meets these criteria, then it
will satisfy the jurisdictional requirements ratione materiae to maintain
a claim against the host state.
Economic Interests in Social Media and Internet Platforms meet
the Definition of Investment as Generally Defined in IIAs.
Simply put, social media and internet platforms must meet the
definition of an investment "because only the assets or interests of
investors that fall within its scope are entitled to the protections of the
treaty."98 If, and only if, social media meets this threshold requirement
can social media platforms move forward to their substantive claims.
Almost all IIAs define investment similarly. 99 Under most HAs,
the term is first defined broadly to include "every kind of asset"100 and
97. ICSID Convention, supra note 93, Art. 25(1); see also Fedax N.V. v. Republic of
Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/3 (July 11, 1997); Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, Award
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2 (Mar. 15, 2002).
98. Mahnaz Malik, Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in
International Investment Agreements, available at www.iisd.org/pdfl2008/dci-recent-
dev.pdf.
99. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 171, 6.26.
100. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 65 § 1.51 (2009) (citing UK-USSR BIT (now UK-Russia) Art. 1(a)(1989); US-
Argentina BIT, Art. I(1)(a) (1991)); see also U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 91, Art. I(1)(c).
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then a non-exhaustive list of rights or interests in property follows. 101
Most U.S. treaties protecting investments are broadly defined in this
manner. 102
The tendency of modern investment agreements, especially the
model agreements of capital exporting states, has been to broaden the
scope of the definition of investment to include many economic interests
and activities that were not originally protected under early treaties
and customary international law. 103
Originally, the term investment was confined to foreign direct
investment, meaning capital that flowed from the enterprise of a person
located in one state, to the enterprise of an entity controlled by the laws
of another state. 104 However, the meaning of the term foreign direct
investment, as it was originally understood, gradually grew more
inclusive.10 5 For instance, the protections offered to foreign investors
were expanded in 1938, when Mexico nationalized American oil
companies.106 In response, the United States insisted that the rules
101. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 163, 6.01. While most IIAs are similar, it should
be noted the various activities or interests covered in most IIAs are not always consistent
with one another given the various types of IIAs that exist. See Noah Rubins, The Notion
of 'Investment' in International Investment Arbitration in ARBITRATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 284 (Norbert
Horn & Stefan M. Kroll eds., 2004). Be aware that some IIAs, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement, do not follow this method. Instead, NAFTA sets a forth
a broad, but exhaustive list of covered economic activities that is contrasted by examples
of commercial transactions which do not amount to investments. Id.
102. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT (2004).
103. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 9 (2d ed.
2004).
104. Id. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), foreign direct investment is defined specifically as an "investment involving a
long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy
(direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy other than of the investor. The direct
investor's purpose is to exert a significant degree of influence on the management of the
enterprise resident in the other economy. FDI involves both the initial transaction
between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them and among
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. FDI may be undertaken by
individuals, as well as business entities." See also Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment
(3d ed. 1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/data oecd/10/16/2090148.pdf ("Foreign
direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity
in one economy ('direct investor') in an entity resident in an economy other than that of
the investor ('direct investment enterprise'). The lasting interest implies the existence of a
long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. Direct investment involves both
the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions
between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.").
105. Malik, supra note 98, at 2.
106. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 397-402 (John H.
Jackson ed., 2002). As is well known, in 1938, in response to Mexico's nationalization of
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related to expropriation and nationalizing upon prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation also be applied to alien's physical property
located in the host state's jurisdiction. 107
Later, in response to the International Court of Justice's decision in
the Barcelona Traction Case,08 modern investment agreements
expanded the term investment to include many forms of intangible
property including leases, mortgages, liens, some classes of loans, and
shares of stock in corporations. 109 After Barcelona Traction, capital
exporting states immediately addressed shareholder protection and
other forms of intangible property in a new wave of international
investment agreements. 110
In addition to these forms of intangible property, capital exporting
states next began to include protection for intellectual property"' and
some forms of government contracts.112 For example, many BITs now
"provide a detailed listing of the types of intellectual property that may
be considered as a form of investment asset, for example, 'copyrights,
patents, utility-model patents, industrial designs, trade-marks, trade-
names, trade and business secrets, technical processes, known-how, and
goodwill."'113
To date no decision concerning an intellectual property rights-
centered arbitration has been publicly reported.114 However, arbitration
American oil companies, U.S. Secretary of State Hull argued that compensation for
expropriation should be "prompt, adequate, and effective." Mexico argued that the
American investors should simply receive expropriation compensation on par with
domestic investors according to the laws of the host government (the Calvo doctrine).
Since the 1930s, the United States and other capital exporting countries have incor-
porated the language of Hull's formula into hundreds of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation treaties and more modern BITs. Since then, Hull's formula has become the
standard for modern IIAs. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), UNCTAD, available at http://
www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?inttemlD=3164&lang-l. See also OECD BENCH-
MARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (3d ed. 1996), OECD, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf.
107. LOWENFELD, supra note 106, at 397-402.
108. Barcelona Traction, supra note 94, at 7.
109. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 103, at 10-11.
110. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 15 (July 20).
Although the treaty at issue in ELSI was negotiated and concluded long before the
International Court of Justice reached its judgment in Barcelona Traction, it was not
until after that case that many capital exporting states began to renegotiate its previous
treaties protecting foreign investment through more modern bilateral trade and
investment agreements.
111. SORNARAJAH, supra note 103, at 11.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Gibson, supra note 38 at 358 (citing German Model Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment issued by the Federal Ministry of
Economics and Labour, art. 1 (2005), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/
dog-publications/Appendixo201% 20Germano20Modelo20Treaty.pdf).
114. Id. at 359.
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panels have found that the following intangible property rights amount
to investments: (1) an office construction project consisting mainly of
plans and various regulatory approvals; (2) a performance contract to
perform liaison customs duties; 15 (3) a hotel construction and operation
contract; 116 (4) a concession agreement to develop and operate a local
port terminal;" 7 (5) an investment in local securities;" and (6) debt
instruments issued by a sovereign state as broadly defined under
various investment agreements.119 Likewise, claims over rights in
broadcast medial 20 and rights in telecommunication properties121 have
been held to be an investment.
The trend in these cases is to prefer a broad view of the term
investment, at least as that term is defined by the IIA. While a few
tribunals have been reluctant to base decisions on jurisdiction solely on
the language that investment means "every kind of investment,"122
others have relied on similar language.123 Other tribunals have simply
preferred not to read any limiting phrases into the definition of
investment unless the treaty provides one itself.124
More importantly, these cases exercise an explicit deference to the
host state's conscious decision to protect investments covered by the
relevant investment agreement.125  Under this analysis, tribunals
simply look to the relevant IIA's definition of investment, and assess
under the customary rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the
115. Soci6t6 Gen6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, TT 99-111 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
116. Holiday Inns v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1, Order taking
note of the discontinuance (Oct. 17, 1978).
117. Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary
Decision on Jurisdiction, §15 (Dec. 8, 1998), 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001).
118. Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, 24.1 (Nov. 27, 2000).
119. Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Objections to
Jurisdiction, 1, 16 (July 11, 1997).
120. Lauder v. Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Rep. 62, Award (2001) (addressing television
broadcast rights in the Czech Republic); CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v.
Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Rep 121, Partial Award (2001) (addressing television broadcast
rights in the Czech Republic for the same conduct complained of in Lauder); Nagel v.
Czech Republic, 13 ICSID Rep. 33, Award (SCC Case 49/2002 Sept. 9, 2003).
121. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 322
(July 29, 2008).
122. See Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgz Republic, SCC Case 126/2003, Award (Mar. 29, 2005);
Jan de Nul N.V. & Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/13, Jurisdiction (June 16, 2006).
123. See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 11
118, 121 (Mar. 21, 2007) (relying on the language "any kind of property").
124. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, supra note 94, at 52.
125. Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the
Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 257, 270 (2010).
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Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties ("VCLT")126 whether the
definition of investment in the IIA is broad enough to cover the asset or
enterprise in question. If the economic activity or interest falls within
the class of activities and interests protected as an investment,
jurisdiction under the relevant IIA is appropriate.
Based on this broadening trend, social media and internet
platforms such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, or YouTube would likely
be able to prove that their economic interests in such platforms amount
to an investment under today's modern IIA structure.
Specifically applying U.S. based social media's interests under the
US-Egypt BIT, 127 investment under that agreement "means every kind
of asset owned or controlled" including but not limited to tangible and
intangible property rights, shares, stock, valid intellectual and
industrial rights such as trademarks, permits, and licenses, etc. 128
According to the customary tools of treaty interpretation found in
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, terms such as "every kind of asset,"
"every kind of investment," "intangible property rights," and
"intellectual property rights" are broad enough to include the property
rights included in domain names discussed above. 129
Giving due regard to Article 31, with its emphasis that the terms of
the treaty shall be interpreted (1) in good faith (2) in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty (3) in their
context and (4) in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, it is
highly likely that the terms "every kind of asset" including intangible
property such as intellectual and industrial rights includes interests in
the shares of social media corporations, the value of trademarks
inherent in the domain names of social media, and may even apply to
the UGC that would have been posted on the social media's platforms
had internet service not been interrupted and access to social media
disabled during the protests in Egypt and other Arab nations.
Furthermore, neither treaty excludes interests in domain names or
internet platforms specifically or any other similar enterprise that could
be analogized to such platforms predating the internet. Moreover, the
treaty, as well as those with Turkey and Tunisia, fails to provide any
type of explanatory phrase within the treaty itself, such as the footnotes
now included in the current US Model BIT which limits the types of
interests that may be considered an investment.
Consequently, based on the broad language in the US-Egypt BIT,
as well as other similar IIAs, it is highly likely that the interests in
126. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
127. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 91, art. I(c).
128. Id. art. I(c)(i)-(vii).
129. VCLT, supra note 126, arts. 31-32.
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social media will amount to an investment as that term is defined in the
US-Egypt BIT, and most likely the US BITs with other Arab nations.
Overcoming Additional Jurisdictional Requirements under ICSID
Despite the broad range of economic interests and activities
protected as an "investment" under the relevant IIA, jurisdiction may
still not be appropriate if it fails to meet the term investment as
understood under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.
As stated above, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that:
the "jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of or in relation to an investment."130  The ICSID
Convention intentionally did not define the term investment. Extensive
research into the travaux prdparatoiresl31 of the ICSID Convention
decidedly demonstrates "[n]o attempt was made to define the term
'investment' given the essential requirement of consent by the parties,
and the mechanism through which Contracting States can make known
in advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or
would not consider submitting to the Centre."132
As noted by Julian Mortenson, the original drafters of the
Convention sought to limit the types of disputes that could be brought
before ICSID.133 However, the drafters also wanted to ensure that a
wide range of economic interests and activities could be adjudicated by
the Centre. 134  To resolve this impasse, the United Kingdom's
delegation suggested that the ICSID Convention leave the term
investment undefined and add a new subsection to Article 25 which
defined the Centre's jurisdiction. This mechanism established "a
procedure for states to notify other signatories of the categories of
dispute that they would not consider submitting to arbitration."135
This approach provided a broad and open-ended definition of the
term investment that could be limited or expanded by the individual
state members through arbitration agreements, notifications to the
Centre under Article 25(4), and reservations from the Convention.136
130. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), March 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965).
131. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 259, 270.
132. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 51 (July 23, 2001). See also Waguih Elie George Siag v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 65 (Apr. 11,
2007).
133. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 280-86.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 290 (citing Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting (Dec. 8,
1964), in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 59, 821-22 (1968)).
136. Id. at 293.
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Based on this broad approach, many arbitration decisions have held
that jurisdiction is nearly a nonjusticiable issue that merges with the
question of party consent. 137 Tribunals following this approach have
approved an extraordinarily wide array of investments including many
of those listed above. 138
Other ICSID tribunals, however, have taken a far more restrictive
approach based on Christoph Schreuer's seminal treatise on the ICSID
Convention in which he listed several factors considered "typical" of
economic interests found to be an investment under previous ICSID
proceedings including:
*"a certain duration" of the enterprise,
*"a certain regularity of profit and return,"
*an "assumption of risk,"
*a "substantial" commitment by the investor, and
*some "significance for the host State's development."139
Since Schreuer's original commentary, tribunals have turned these
factors into a prescriptive set of requirements.14 0 For instance, in
Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, a case involving a highway construction
contract, the tribunal turned Schreuer's factors into a rigid test now
known as the Salini Test.141 In its decision, the tribunal determined the
claimant's contractual rights were not investments under Article 25 of
the ICSID Convention, but were instead mere unenforceable promises.
Since Salini, other tribunals have gone on to reject a totality-of-the-
circumstances balancing of the factors, preferring an objective
fulfillment of each element.14 2
137. Id. at 269 (citing Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, 13.5-
13.6 (Nov. 27, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 483 (2006); Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, § 48 (Dec. 8, 1998), 40
I.L.M. 457 (2001)).
138. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 127.
139. SCHREUER I, supra note 94, art. 25, T 122.
140. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 272.
141. Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction,
55-57 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003).
142. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 273 (citing Helnan Int'l Hotels, A.S. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, 77
(Oct. 17, 2006); Saipem, S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 99
(Mar. 21, 2007); Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Award on Jurisdiction 106(e) ("If any of [the Salini factors] are absent, the tribunal will
hesitate (and probably decline) to make a finding of "investment.")). Mr. Mortenson,
however, has noted that other tribunals have hinted at a more liberal version of Salini.
See Mortenson, supra note 125, at 273 (citing L.E.S.I., S.p.A. v. R6publique alg~rienne
ddmocratique et populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Award for Lack of Jurisdiction
(July 12, 2006) Consortium Groupement Lesi-Dipenta v. Republique algdrienne
d~mocratique et populaire), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award for Lack of Jurisdiction
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Schreuer later commented it was "unfortunate" that such practice
had occurred. 143 As Schreuer explained in his second edition to his
commentary, these elements were not meant to establish individual
elements necessary for jurisdiction, but were merely typical of the types
of economic interests brought forth under the ICSID Convention. 144
Nevertheless, as noted by Mortenson, since 2006, seven decisions have
adopted the Salini approach, while two - Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania
and the Malaysian Historical Salvors annulment - rejected it. 145 Other
cases not noted by Mortenson also rejected the Salini test as a set of
prescriptive requirements. 146
As Mortenson notes, certain types of enterprise will likely be
unaffected by the incorporation of Schreuer's factors as a prescriptive
test; 14 7 indeed, Schreuer pulled the factors from those industries that
were often brought before an ICSID body in the first place. But such
rigid jurisdictional requirements will likely continue to affect pure
services contracts, financial interests, and other forms of intangible
property rights such as intellectual property and interests in internet
based platforms.
Nevertheless, interests in social media and other internet platforms
can make a compelling case that they fall within the scope of the so-
called Salini test. But, even if such interests do not meet these rigid
requirements, it is possible to bring the claim outside of ICSID or to
have a hand in the selection of the tribunal itself, such that the
members of the tribunal do not follow the Salini test. Consequently, it
is still possible that interests in social media and other internet
platforms will fall within the jurisdictional prerequisites to bring a
claim for state suppression of internet service and the blocking of social
media.
Remaining Limits on Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae: Territorial
Requirements
A further limitation on jurisdiction ratione materiae may exist if
the IIA limits the subject matter jurisdiction of a tribunal to those cases
(Jan. 10, 2005), 19 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INv. L.J 426 (2004); and Phoenix Action, Ltd. v.
Czech, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 1 85 (Apr. 15, 2009) (turning Gaillard's
approach into a rebuttable presumption that any economic activity contributes to the
domestic economy).
143. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH, & ANTHONY
SINCLAIR, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 133, 171 (2d ed. 2009).
144. Id. 1 172.
145. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 277.
146. See, e.g., Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v Republic of Leb. ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, IT 82-84 (Sept. 11, 2009); L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et Astaldi
S.p.A. v. Republique algdrienne d6mocratique et populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction, I 72(iv) (Jul. 12, 2006).
147. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 315.
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over an investment that is made within the territory of the host
state.' 'm Few cases have turned on this requirement, focusing instead
on whether an investment has been made as a whole. However, if such
a requirement is necessary or read into the relevant IIA, then it surely
will be raised as an objection to jurisdiction in a case involving social
media because of the internet's nature to be "created" outside of the
host state.
It should be noted at the outset that no such requirement in the
definition of investment exists in the US-Egypt BIT or the U.S.-Turkey
BIT, although each require territoriality in the application of its MFN
and national treatment standards. By contrast, the US-Tunisia BIT
mandates territoriality in the definition of investment. Consequently,
according to the customary rules of treaty interpretation, in any
potential arbitration between a U.S. based social media platform and
Egypt, territoriality is not a necessary requirement.
However, assuming arguendo that territoriality is explicitly or
implicitly required by the relevant IIA, territoriality will not necessarily
deprive a tribunal of jurisdiction merely because the social media
platform is owned, controlled, or originated by U.S. corporations
situated in U.S. territory. Rather, the trend in international
investment arbitration, especially with respect to intangible property,
looks not to the physical location of the property making up the
investment, but rather to where the benefits of the investment flow. 14 9
If the benefits of the investment touch and concern the state with which
a dispute exists, jurisdiction will likely be upheld.
For example, in Fedax N. V. v. Republic of Venezuela,1 50 the tribunal
recognized the existence of an investment in debt instruments acquired
on the secondary market even though those instruments were not held
in the territory of Venezuela. There the tribunal held that it is a
standard feature of financial transactions that the funds involved are
"not physically transferred to the territory of the beneficiary, but put at
its disposal elsewhere."5 1 Nevertheless, because the benefits of such
instruments - credit available to Venezuela - were used by Venezuela
148. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 180, 6.59.
149. See Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Objections to
Jurisdiction, 41 (Jul. 11, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 186 (2002); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni
Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Objections to Jurisdiction,
90 (May 24, 1999), 14 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 251 (1999) [hereinafter CSOB v.
Slovak Republic]; Soci6t6 Gen6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of the Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, T 125 (Aug. 6, 2003) 8 ICSID Rep.
406 (2005); Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil. ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, 99 -107 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005);
Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, 277-79 (Nov.
8, 2010).
150. Fedax, T 41.
151. Id.
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for its various needs, the interest in the promissory notes and other
debt instruments were considered an investment in the territory of
Venezuela. 15 2
Similarly, in both SGS v. Pakistan,153 and SGS v. Philippines,154
the tribunals noted that the pre-shipment customs inspection service
contracts, carried out predominately outside the host country,
amounted to an investment in the territory of Pakistan and the
Philippines because the benefits of those services occurred in the
territory of the host governments. In SGS v. Pakistan, the tribunal
noted that the contract may not meet the "'traditional' notion of an
investment, [but] nevertheless [the contracts] fall within the category of
new investments covered by [the] BIT." 155 Also, the contracts caused an
"injection of funds into the territory of Pakistan for the carrying out of
SGS's engagements under the [service contracts]."156 These attributes
of the economic interests involved amounted to an investment in the
territory of Pakistan.
In SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal went further by explaining the
contract was designed "to provide services, within and outside the
Philippines, with a view to improving and integrating the import
services and associated customs revenue gathering of the
Philippines."15 7 Because those services were rendered for the benefit of
the Philippines, and the customs reports and licenses were issued
directly to the Philippines and not to any outside non-territorial agency,
the tribunal considered that a "substantial and non-severable aspect of
the overall service was provided in the Philippines."158 Together, these
facts qualified the service as one provided in the Philippines.
Likewise, in CSOB v. the Slovak Republic, the tribunal found that
the "'entire process' of economic activity, even though particular aspects
of it were not locally performed" 59 amounted to an investment in the
territory of the Slovak Republic.
Finally, in Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, the tribunal
dismissed the Ukraine's arguments that funds transferred outside the
Ukraine for the benefit of a hotel construction project in the Ukraine
152. Id. 42.
153. SGS Soci6t6 G~ndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of the Pak., ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, T 125 (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406
(2005) [hereinafter SGS v. Pak.].
154. SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, IT 99 -107 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518
(2005) [hereinafter SGS v. Phil.].
155. SGS v. Pak., T 126.
156. Id. 136.
157. SGS v. Phil., 101.
158. Id. T 102.
159. Id. 110 (citing CSOB v. Slovak Republic, supra note 149, 1 88).
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did not meet the territoriality requirement of the relevant IIA.160
Rather, because those funds were utilized for the benefit of the Ukraine,
territoriality was met.
Based on this trend, interests in social media may also meet the
territoriality requirements explicitly required or implicitly read into
Arab BITs with the U.S. because the benefit of the investment in social
media is located everywhere, including inside the host government.
Like sophisticated financial transactions, the use and structure of
social media and the internet pay little attention to state boundaries.
Rather, social media and the internet center on the user of the platform
and the manner in which those users facilitate and further online
relationships and share information. With respect to social media
specifically, users create all of the content and provide the value of the
platform from where ever they are, not where the platform exists. This
phenomenon has resulted in a sea change in how we communicate and
see the world such that news, events, business, and all other aspects of
life are no longer solely broadcasted to others but broadcasted by
others, 16 1 resulting in an immense value to the state in which social
media exists.
Consequently, the location of the social media platform is largely
irrelevant, because the benefits of its effects are everywhere, all at once,
both inside and outside the host government. By extending the analysis
of previous cases involving intangible property where territoriality was
met when the state was benefited by the investment, tribunals will be
able to uphold jurisdiction on any potential case involving social media.
No doubt, upholding jurisdiction in this manner will be
controversial. Critics will likely argue that permitting a case to be
brought where an investment was not actually made in the host state
betrays the original purpose of agreements protecting foreign direct
investment. But such criticism fails to realize the nature of and
movement to e-commerce. The investment is not made in any one
national jurisdiction. Like space above, the internet is everywhere, all
around us, and omnipresent. The fact that the internet knows no
national boundaries is what creates its true value. It allows
information to be shared instantly, all at once, everywhere. When
states block the internet they deprive the internet of its value and the
value of the investment made therein.
Another criticism lies in the traditional notion of positivism.
Historically, states, as a function of sovereignty, placed conditions on
160. Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, 1I 277-
79 (Nov. 8, 2010).
161. See Scott Monty, Foreword to ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICs: How SOCIAL MEDIA
TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE LIVE AND Do BUSINESS, xiv (2011).
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the entry of aliens and their property within its borders. 162 To stoke
investment and improve economic conditions within their borders,
states have given up attributes of their sovereignty by entering IIAs.
Historically, then, to be included within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the IIA, the investment must have been located physically within the
state's borders or targeted to specifically affect interests therein.
Despite the modern trend articulated above, allowing economic
interests in e-commerce to gain access to the state's market simply
because the investment exists online and has collateral benefits for the
state will strip the state of far more sovereignty than it originally
intended. Even in those cases where intangibles were held outside the
state, the overall investment was specifically targeted to the respondent
state. In a general sense, interests in social media are not.
However, with the ever increasing scope of investments protected
within today's modern investment law regime, protections have been
extended far beyond those originally contemplated, and will often be
located outside the host government. Had the state intended to restrict
the scope of investments that may have been protected, the host states
should have included exceptions or restrictions in the relevant IIA.
Moreover, social media platforms often do make actual investments in
the host states to further the reach of their platforms. For instance,
Facebook often hires programmers and staff members overseas to
extend its platforms in new markets.163
Like in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, where the
tribunals considered that having local offices in the host governments
constituted part of the overall investment, 16 4 these activities may
overcome general objections to any arguments based on positivism.
Despite the tension between the scope of investments under IIAs
and between limitations on jurisdiction found in both HAs and Article
25 of the ICSID Convention, international investment law has proven
highly adept at allowing new forms of commerce to be protected under
investment protection. While there are legitimate arguments for not
recognizing new media as an investment in the territory of a host state,
it is highly unlikely such a result will occur given the size, scope, and
growth of e-commerce. Consequently, given the internet's effects on all
states, and modern trends in international investment arbitration, it is
far more likely that investment in social media will meet the
jurisdictional requirements embedded in international investment law.
162. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (7th ed. 2008).
163. See generally Facebook Careers, http://www.facebook.com/careers/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2012) (listing job openings, with many international postings in host countries).
164. See SGS v. Phil., T 104 -08.
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The Substantive Protections in International Investment
Agreements Prevent States from Blocking Websites
Once interests in social media meet these jurisdictional thresholds,
potential claimants must still prove that their interests have been
mistreated under the relevant IIA. IIAs contain a myriad protections
for covered investors. By and large though, most contain three core
protections: (1) the prohibition on expropriation without adequate,
prompt, and effective, compensation; (2) the obligation to afford fair and
equitable treatment; and (3) the obligation to afford similar treatment
as other aliens and nationals.
No attempt is made here to thoroughly exhaust and analyze
whether censorship during the Arab Spring, or by other states such as
China, violated these substantive protections. Such an effort goes
beyond the scope of this article, and would require a significant
discussion of the substantive protections, a detailed analysis of
international responsibility including conditions precluding
wrongfulness during national emergencies, and a comprehensive
examination of the factual situation in each state that blocks social
media.
However, on a cursory review of at least the standards on
expropriation and the obligation to afford fair and equitable treatment,
it is likely that such states have breached the protections afforded in
relevant investment agreements.
Blocking Access to Social Media and the Internet May Amount to
Expropriation
International law has long prohibited nationalizations and
expropriations without adequate, prompt, and effective compensation
(the Hull formula). This standard has long been included in modern
IIAs. 165
The US-Egypt IIA is typical of most expropriation provisions. It
provides:
No investment or any part of an investment of a national or
company of either Party shall be expropriated or nationalized by
the other Party or by a subdivision thereof or subjected to
any other measure, direct or indirect, if the effect of such other
measure, or a series of such other measures, would be
tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ....
165. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1110, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993); Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Egypt, Art. III(1), Mar. 11, 1986,
available at http://tec.export.gov/Trade Agreements/AllTradeAgreements/exp_002813.
asp.
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Most IIAs, including the US-Egypt BIT, do not provide a definition
of expropriation. However, expropriatory conduct is generally held to
include
not only open, deliberate[,] and acknowledged takings of
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory
transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of
the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host State. 166
An expropriation can take many forms and be both direct and
indirect.167 As can be expected, many tribunals have taken a broad
view of what amounts to an expropriation. 168  Under this view a
government measure that interferes with the use of foreign investors'
property such that they cannot use the property or reap expected
benefits there from amounts to an expropriation. 16 9 Other tribunals
have taken a much more narrow view. 170 In these cases, conduct
considered expropriatory occurs when the regulatory action deprives
the claimant of control of his company, interferes directly in the
internal operations, or displaces the claimant as the controlling
shareholder. 171
In analyzing the Arab Spring, these competing methods would
likely be pitted against each other in any case involving the crackdown
on social media. Balancing the police powers of the state, the
proportionality of the means involved, and other factors will also weigh
heavily on any potential tribunal.
166. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/1, Award, 1
103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
167. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83 at 290-97, 11 8.68 - 8.89.
168. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983); Tippets
v. Iran, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984); Metalclad v. United Mexican States,
107; Waste Mgmt., Inc., v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/3, Award,
IT 143-44 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004).
169. John B. Fowles, Swords into Plowhsares: Softening the Edge of NAFTA's Chapter
11 Regulatory Expropriations Provisions, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 83, 85 (2006).
170. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 281-82 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL 2000);
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 258, 1 96, 100-02 (NAFTA 2000); Feldman v.
Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 1 100 (2002); Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44
I.L.M. 1345, 1 23 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 2005).
171. Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatory Expropriations under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 245, 248 (2002); Michael G.
Parisi, Moving Towards Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in
International Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 383, 391 (2005).
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Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that under either view, the
economic interest in social media is expropriated when states shut
down internet access and block social media. Under the broad view, the
government measures taken certainly interfered with social media and
internet services' expected property rights and prevented those
interests from receiving the expected benefits inherent therein. Under
the narrow view though, the actions taken by Egypt and other Arab
States did not divest shareholders of their shares, wrest control of any
corporation away from its officers, or even interfere with the
corporation's internal affairs. Then again, even under the narrow view,
blocking access to the domain name may be akin to preventing someone
access to their physical property such that a digital taking has occurred
even under the narrow view.
Whether an expropriation has occurred will also depend heavily on
the facts of the situation. Given the political turmoil in Egypt, Tunisia,
Libya, and other Arab States since 2011, states will certainly argue
their actions were taken in a time of national emergency and invoke
necessity, both as a non-precluded measure, if available under the
relevant IIA, and as a condition precluding the wrongfulness of their
conduct under customary international law. Necessity is available as a
non-precluded measure if the relevant IIA provides necessity as a basis
for not providing the requisite standards of treatment. 1 7 2 Indeed the
US-Egypt BIT contains such a clause in Article X allowing "all
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order. ."173
Under customary international law as reflected under Article 25 of
the Articles of State Responsibility, 1 7 4 necessity "may not be invoked by
a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act . .. unless
the act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously
impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole."175
Article 25 also states that "necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if . .. the State has contributed to
the situation of necessity."176
172. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic (Award) ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, TT 226-61 (recognizing that the "state of necessity" exist in international law,
particularly in 245) (2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic (Award)
ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, 1 101-09, 121-36 (2005); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine
Republic (Annulment Proceeding) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, IT 159-200 (2010).
173. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 91, art. X.
174. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovn.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39-41 (Sept.
25).
175. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/83, art.25(l) (Jan. 28, 2002).
176. Id. art. 25(2).
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Whether either condition removes potential liability for the
blocking of internet access during the Arab Spring will depend heavily
on the facts of each state's conduct, and the manner in which such
conditions are interpreted under traditional methods of
interpretation. 177 Nevertheless, depending on the specific tribunal's
view, it is highly possible that certain forms of internet censorship
during the Arab Spring and in other states amount to an expropriation
of the investment in social media and other internet platforms.
Denying Access to Social Media and the Internet Likely Violates
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
Most HAs require the host government treat an investment in
accordance with the fair and equitable treatment ("FET") standard.
FET is a fixed standard that applies a level of treatment owed to foreign
investors regardless of how a host state treats its own nationals. 178
While most HAs outright require FET, the US-Egypt BIT merely
requires that the "treatment, protection and security of investments
shall never be less than that required by international law and national
legislation." Such language likely means that Egypt only applies the
minimum standard of treatment ("MST") found in customary
international law. Typically, the MST requires foreign nations to treat
aliens and their property in a manner that would avoid "an outrage, [ ]
bad faith, [some] willful neglect of duty, or [ ] an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency." 1 79
Since the decision in Glamis Gold, Ltd v. United States of
America,180 it has been discussed whether the MST has evolved beyond
the Neer standard to include some of the substantive protections
afforded by the FET standard. 181 Based on Glamis, it is likely that the
MST is still a floor, below FET; whether the reaches of that floor have
shifted higher is another issue.
However, if a claim is brought under some other IIA protecting the
fair and equitable treatment of investments, then the state suppression
of internet access and the blocking of social media may violate the FET
standard dependent on the facts of the suppression.
177. See generally Javier Garcia Olmedo, The Balance between NPM Clauses and
Investors Protection under Bits: The Enron Annulment Decision, 16 No. 1 INT. B. Ass'N
ARB. NEWS 178 (2011).
178. Margaret Clare Ryan, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States and the Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard, 56 McGILL L.J. 919, 927 (2011).
179. Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (1926).
180. Glamis Gold, Ltd v. United States of America, Award, 48 ILM 1039 (June 8 2009).
181. See Ryan, supra note 178, at 928; see also Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada
48 ILM 1038 (2010).
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Cases involving the FET standard fall into two broad categories: (1)
the treatment of investors in the courts of the host government; and (2)
administrative or executive decision making. In the case of the Arab
Spring, the actions to shut down internet activity and block social
media fall within the second category.
The majority of cases involving FET in the context of
administrative decision-making have been concerned with the licensure
of investments, or a fundamental change in the law affecting the
investment climate. 182 In determining whether the FET standard has
been breached, tribunals often evaluate these issues according to the
legitimate expectations of the investor and whether the investor's
property rights have been afforded due process.18 3
In Tecmed, the tribunal considered that the FET standard, in light
of the good faith principle established by international law, required
host governments to provide investments "treatment that does not
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investor to make the investment[,]"1 8 4 including the host State (1) "to
act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may
know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations[;]"1 85 (2) to act consistently, without
arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the
State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments
as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities; 86
(3) to "use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor
or the investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to
such instruments[;]"1 87 and (4) "not to deprive the investor of its
investment without the required compensation."188
The tribunal continued:
[F]ailure by the host State to comply with such pattern of
conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its investments
affects the investor's ability to measure the treatment and
182. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83 at 233-34 7.99.
183. Id.; See also Occidental Exploration and Production Co v. Republic of Ecuador
(Award) UNCITRAL (2004); T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican
States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M 133, 173 (2004).
184. T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133, 154 (2004).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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protection awarded by the host State and to determine whether
the actions of the host State conform to the fair and equitable
treatment principle.189
The FET standard also requires the host government to provide
due-process in its decision making. Where states engage in a process of
discrimination, lack of transparency, use of powers for improper
purposes, inconsistently, for purposes of coercion and harassment, or in
bad faith, due process is denied to the investor.190
Each of these considerations applies in some manner to the Arab
Spring, and how access to the internet and to social media was blocked
during the protests. While these actions must again be taken in context
with the state's need to respond to the emergency presented by the
protests and demonstrations, there is a strong case that the states
violated the substantive rights to FET held by digital platforms.
CONCLUSIONS
Social media's power to organize and speak is undeniable. During
the protests in Cairo, one activist powerfully tweeted: "We use Facebook
to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the
world[.]"'191 When we look back at the Arab Spring and its
consequences, perhaps we will be able to add that Facebook, Google,
Twitter, and YouTube used the power of investment law to defend the
right to protest, coordinate, and tell the world.
Bringing claims on behalf of social media and other internet
platforms will be filled with procedural and substantive pitfalls. But,
based on current trends in international investment arbitration, it is
highly likely that such platforms will meet the jurisdictional challenges
that will ultimately be raised by those states blocking access to social
media and the internet at large.
If social media and internet platforms can successfully hurdle those
jurisdictional bars, and ultimately prove their substantive claims,
international investment law can be used as a powerful tool, by
powerful corporations, to uphold and enhance the human rights of
oppressed peoples.
Between November 1989, as the Berlin Wall began to tumble, and
December 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union, the world watched in
amazement how economic and political liberalization lifted the Iron
Curtain.192 At the fall of the Soviet Union, three persons, the President,
189. Id.
190. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 239 T 7.115.
191. Howard, supra note 29.
192. See Moran R. Davis, How Central Asia was Won: A Revival of the "the Great
Game" 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417, 418 (2011) citing JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the Pope, and the Prime Minister - Ronald Reagan, John Paul II, and
Margaret Thatcher - were praised for their roles above all others in
lifting the Iron Curtain. 193  Today, there exists a digital curtain
shrouding totalitarian and oppressive regimes preventing peoples' basic
human liberties: freedom of speech, assembly, thought, expression, and
assembly. Private actors have tools that did not truly exist at the
collapse of the Soviet Union to affect such sweeping change. Today they
do. Facebook, Google, and Twitter have the power, and the means, to
challenge those who would oppress and prevent the establishment of
self-government.
Such would be a welcome development. Recent scholarship on the
intersection of human rights and international investment law tends to
bemoan international investment law's impact on human rights. 194
However, the issue of internet censorship and the blocking of social
media presents a new opportunity to demonstrate how international
investment law can be used to defend and increase access to human
rights, albeit in a nontraditional method.
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